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RECENT CASES

fact that the beneficiary's right arose only at the death of the promisee.
However the strong majority rule is that a contract is not made testamentary by the fact that the donee beneficiary's right is postponed until
the death of the promisee." If it were otherwise, life insurance contracts in which the insurance is payable to one other than the estate of
the insured would be testamentary.' 2 Also, since the contract was in
full force during the promisee's lifetime, there is no reason to surround
it with the formalities which safeguard a will. 1'
The court thought the contract testamentary mainly, it seems,
",14
because the promisee "retained full control over the contract
It appears that the court in using this reasoning misunderstood the
problem. "Control," in this context, is a personal property term. 5 But
this is not a case of a personal property right, as such, but a contract
right. The third party beneficiary's right is a contract right whether he
be creditor or donee. The right in question in the principal case is
created by a contract between the promisor and the promisee, the
validity of which is determined by the law of contracts 16 and not by the
law of gifts of personal property Therefore, the court should have
upheld the appellant's right to recover as a donee beneficiary.
Charles Samuel Whitehead

CONTRACTS-AN INTERPRETATION OF TEE UNIFORMAv

COIMMZIERCIAL CODE

2-207(1) - Plaintiff, a manufacturer of cellophane bags,
ordered a drum of emulsion from defendant. In replying, defendant
mailed a standardized form of acknowledgment stating various terms
of sale which included a clause disclaiming any warranties whatsoever.
Plaintiff received the emulsion, but bags produced with it failed to
adhere. In an action for breach of warranty plaintiff contended
SECTION

" Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Ellis, 125 F.2d 127 (2d Cir. 1942);
Robinson s Women s Apparel, Inc. v. Union Bank & Trust Co., 67 F. Supp. 895
(S.D.N.Y. 1946); Kansas City Life Ins. Co. v. Raney, 358 Mo. 477, 182 S.W.2d
624 (1944); In re Kosss Estate, 106 N.J. Eq. 323, 150 Atl. 360 (1930); Roberts
v. Ellis, 229 Ore. 609, 868 P.2d 342 (1962); Peoples Bank v. Baxter, 41 Tenn.
App. 710, 298 S.W.2d 732 (1956); But see McCarthy v. Pieret, 281 N.Y. 407, 24
N.E.2d 102 (1939), criticized m 53 Harv.L. Rev. 1060 (1940) and 51 Yale L.J.
1 (1941).
2
Robinson s Women s Apparel, Inc. v. Union Bank & Trust Co., supra note
11.
i Kansas City Life Ins. Co. v. Rainey, 358 Mo. 477, 182 S.W.2d 624 (1944).
14 Coley v. English, 357 S.W.2d 529, 531 (Ark. 1962).
15 See Brown, Personal Property §39 (1955). Control is an aspect of the

delivery requirement m the law of gifts of personal property. If after an alleged
delivery the donor still retains control over whatever is given, there is no gift
16 Roberts v. Ellis, 229 Ore. 609, 368 P.2d 342 (1962); see 4 Corbin, Contracts 71 (1951).
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defendaft's acknowledgment was an acceptance of its order and created
a contract winch did not include the disclaimer of warranties. At the
close of the evidence a verdict was directed for the defendant and
plaintiff appealed. Held: Affirmed. Under section 2-207(1) of the
Uniform Commercial Code' an acknowledgment wich adds a term
materially altering the obligation of the parties solely to the disadvantage of the offeror is an acceptance which does not become effective
until the offeror assents to this additional term. Acceptance of the
goods with knowledge of the additional term manifests this assent.
Roto-Lith, Ltd. v. F P Bartlett 6 Co., 297 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1962).
It was well settled before the advent of the U.C.C. that a response
which stated additional terms could not operate as an acceptance, but
was merely a counteroffer.2 Section 2-207(1) of the U.C.C. changes
this rule by providing:
A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written
confirmation which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an
acceptance even though it states terms additional to or different from
those offered or agreed upon, unless acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or different terms.

The principal case is noteworthy as the first case interpreting this section.
Section 2-207(1) has been praised as a step forward in the law of
sales because it offers a sound commercial solution to the problem
arising when the parties use conflicting standardized forms in making
and acknowledging orders.3 The drafters of the U.C.C. explain the
section as meaning that a "proposed deal" or offer responded to by a
writing accepting it creates a contract even though it contains additional
terms. 4 Writers interpreting the section reach the same conclusion.5
In the pnncipal case, however, the court refused to apply this
interpretation of the section. While admitting that this interpretation
should be used in most cases, the court stated the rule differs when
the response contains an added term which materially alters the
1This section is contained in Mass. Ann. Laws e.106, §2-207(1) (1958). The
Uniform Commercial Code is hereinafter referred to in text and footnotes as UCC.
2 Restatement, Contracts §60 (1932).
3
Hawkland, Sales and Bulk Sales (Under the Uniform Commercial Code)
8-10 (1958).
4UCC §2-207, comments 1 & 2 (1958).
5 Hawkland, op. cit. supra note 3, at 9; Carrington, The Uniform Commercial
Code-Sales, Bulk Sales and Documents of Title, 15 Wyo. L.J. 1 6 (1962);
Lorenson, The Uniform Commercial Code Sales Article Compared with West
Virma Law, 64 W Va. L. Rey?. 32, 55 (1962); Lattin, The Uniform Commercial
Code Article 2: Sales, 23 Ohio St. L.J. 185, 187 (1962); Mason, Montana Law
and the Uniform Commercial Code, 21 Mont. L, Rev. 1, 11 (1960); Note, The
Uniform Commercial Code and Contract Law: Some Selected Problems, 105
U. Pa. L. Rev. 836, 861 (1957); Note, 46 Cornell L.Q. 308, 815 (1958).
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obligation of the parties solely to the disadvantage of the offeror. If
such term exists the court held that as a matter of law the acceptance
does not become effective until the offeror assents to this term, and
acceptance of the goods with knowledge of the additional term
manifests this assent. The court rationalized it is "unrealistic" to
assume that an offeree who adds a term "burdensome" only to the
offeror intends to make an unconditional acceptance of the offer and
leaves it to the "good nature" of the offeror to assent to the additional
term proposed. Therefore, the court concluded that such a response is
expressly conditional on the offeror's assent.
This reasoning is difficult to reconcile with a literal interpretation of
section 2-207(1) Clearly under this section, a response proposing an
additional term operates as an acceptance creating a contract unless
made expressly conditional on the offeror's assent. Contrary to the
rule of the principal case, the addition of a term which would materially
alter the offer does not make the acceptance expressly conditional.
Therefore, it seems the court has misapplied the rule.
The court could have reached this same result without resorting to
this construction. Defendant's acknowledgment stated that if the terms
were not acceptable, buyer must notify seller at once. Might not the
court have held this clause made defendant's response expressly
conditional on assent to the additional term proposed? The court,
however, did not choose this available avenue even though it seems to
offer a more sound solution.1
The net effect of the principal case is to place a restriction on the
scope of section 2-207(1) of the U.C.C. by preventing the formation
of a contract when an acceptance contains an additional term materially
altering the terms of the offer. This is unfortunate in view of the
evident purpose of this section, which is to promote the formation of
contracts despite the presence of additional or conflicting terms in an
acceptance. This restriction, if adhered to by other courts, will prevent
section 2-207(1) from accomplishing its intended result which is to
solve the problem created by the use of standardized forms.
PaulD. Gudgel
0 The court adopted the position of UCC §2-207, comment 4 that the mclusiaon of a disclaimer of warranties in an acceptance constitutes adding a term
which would materially alter the contract as stated in §2-207(2).
7Even though the court did not adopt this avenue the case brings out a
question which may become important in future litigation. That question is:
What will courts require of the offeree in making his acceptance expressly conditional on the offeror's assent to the additional terms? The drafters have provided
no gtude lines for answering it, and how expressly conditional an acceptance
must be to prevent it from consummating a contract under the rule of- UCC
§2-207(1) remains to be seen.

